

PROVISIONAL
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PT.

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

later: Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco)

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Election of Vice-Presidents (continued)

General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6) (continued)

The PRESIDENT recalled that in compliance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference had already elected 21 of the statutory 26 Vice-Presidents. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, the Republic of Korea and Yemen had presented candidates for the five remaining posts. In the absence of objection, he would take it that the Conference endorsed those candidatures.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) said that the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons assumed particular significance against the background of the rapid and very important changes that were taking place. Current events should provide the impetus necessary to ensure that the Treaty was both applied and observed. The NPT, whose provisions would, if they were genuinely respected, permit the international community to achieve total disarmament, constituted a most important instrument for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world; and that was why the Conference should carefully monitor its application, particularly in countries situated in regions where there was conflict. The Egyptian Government again appealed to South Africa and Israel to adhere to the Treaty as rapidly as possible. It welcomed the decision by China and France to attend the Conference as observers: that constituted a further step towards extension of the Treaty. Egypt unreservedly endorsed the objectives of the Treaty and hoped that the Conference would take place in an atmosphere of dialogue rather than confrontation.

East-West rapprochement gave cause for optimism concerning the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the other hand, events in the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrated that regional disarmament and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones were very important measures for the strengthening of peace and security. In the 1964 Cairo Declaration, the Egyptian Government had committed itself to the promotion of a nuclear-weapon-free Africa. Furthermore, Egypt had begun negotiations with Iran on the subject of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That initiative had been endorsed by the General Assembly at its session in 1974 and, every year since 1980, a consensus resolution had been adopted on the subject. In 1988 the Secretary-General of the United Nations had convened a group of experts to study the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and Egypt

looked forward to the group's findings. The Government hoped that non-nuclear-weapon States would abstain from helping others in the same situation to acquire such weapons and was most grateful to IAEA for its study on ways and means of implementing the provisions of the Treaty in the region. It would continue to assist the Director-General of the Agency in seeking to ensure that all the countries of the region placed their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. On 8 April 1990 President Mubarak had taken the initiative of calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a matter of the greatest urgency, and seeking a total ban on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East and a commitment on the part of all the countries of the region to respect such a ban. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would complement the international efforts undertaken within the framework of the NPT and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to secure a treaty banning chemical weapons.

A new era had begun in 1945: the nuclear era, which had also ushered in an age of insecurity. States without nuclear weapons feared that States with such weapons might use them; that was why the Egyptian Government wished to see an article in the Treaty guaranteeing non-nuclear-weapon States protection from that threat. In that connection, Security Council resolution 255 of 1968 was unlikely to be effective. Moreover, although the five nuclear-weapon States had individually declared that they would not use them against States which did not possess such weapons, it was difficult to interpret those commitments, except that of China, as unconditional.

The Egyptian Government consequently hoped that the Security Council would adopt a new resolution to remedy those shortcomings.

The Egyptian Government invited all nuclear-weapon States to take advantage of prevailing circumstances to step up their negotiations with a view to total disarmament.

Recalling that article IV of the 1967 Treaty provided that States should undertake not to deploy nuclear weapons in outer space, the Egyptian Government called on the two super-Powers to intensify their negotiations in order to bring the arms race in that domain as rapidly as possible to an end.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty would constitute an important milestone on the road towards both horizontal and vertical non-proliferation. The Egyptian Government therefore supported General Assembly resolution 44/106 on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and

under water. It welcomed the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament and the creation of a Committee on the banning of nuclear tests and hoped that negotiations would lead to a comprehensive test ban.

Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would help to resolve economic crises by freeing resources for the campaign against drought, desertification and pollution. In that connection, the States Parties should have access to the information necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Non-nuclear-weapon States had clearly committed themselves to respect the provisions of the Treaty. It was time for the nuclear-weapon States to do the same. They could make a start in that direction by reinforcing the security of States which had pledged themselves not to acquire such weapons.

Mr. ROZENTAL (Mexico) recalled that Mexico had been the first of the Latin American and Caribbean countries to ratify the 1963 Moscow Treaty, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was on those three pillars, together with the Treaty of Rarotonga, that the present international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was built - a régime which was not yet universal, and which had not achieved its principal objective: a world completely free of nuclear weapons. Mexico's adherence to those multilateral agreements demonstrated a consistent policy based on the conviction that nuclear arms must be done away with. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the corner-stone of the régime of total absence of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Mexican Government once again urged France to ratify additional Protocol I of the Treaty; it also called on all those Latin American and Caribbean countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT sought merely to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although for some the Treaty was a brake to horizontal non-proliferation, it should not be forgotten that article VI and the preambular paragraphs referred to nuclear disarmament and the banning of all nuclear weapon tests. For the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, however, the Treaty also constituted a brake to vertical proliferation. That position was reflected in resolution 2028 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 19 November 1965 which, in turn, was based on the memorandum submitted by the delegations of the so-called Group of Eight of the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, according to which a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself but only a means to the achievement

of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament, and that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

The NPT was also designed to promote international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that regard, the Mexican Government had continued to support the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Welcoming the fact that more than 140 States were currently Parties to the Treaty, Mexico regretted that not all States had acceded to it. The absence of certain States was particularly significant; and the time had come for an open and constructive dialogue with them in order to identify the controversial elements of the present non-proliferation régime and find solutions acceptable to all. The Mexican Government welcomed the presence as observers of many non-party States.

The Fourth Review Conference was more important than its predecessors, since it was the last one to be held before 1995, when the Parties would have to come to a decision with regard to the extension of the Treaty. Thus, the present Conference would have to examine those nuclear disarmament measures which must be adopted before 1995, so as to lay the groundwork for the longest possible extension of the Treaty. The three Depositary States, which possessed nuclear weapons, had not met their obligations under the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty, and that was why the Mexican delegation attached great importance to the draft resolution reproduced in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1, in which the Group of Non-Aligned and other States had set before the Conference a proposal designed to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and ensure its extension beyond 1995.

He subscribed fully to the statement by the representative of the Non-Aligned Group and expressed the hope that the Fourth Review Conference would make headway in the direction of a genuine régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Encouraging initiatives had taken place in the field of disarmament since 1985; various measures had been adopted since 1987 to prevent the risks of nuclear war and increase confidence, especially in Europe; important agreements had also been, or were in the process of being reached.

Nevertheless, the absence of political will to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty continued to be an obstacle to nuclear disarmament. The United States, the United Kingdom and their NATO allies insisted on the need to continue nuclear testing in order to maintain the credibility of their nuclear arsenals and justify their doctrine of deterrence. In the middle of 1990, it might well be asked who was to be deterred. Europe was in the throes of profound transformations. The matter was no longer one of adapting the military doctrines of the past to new realities, since those doctrines themselves had expired. The thinking of the Cold War years had to be unlearned, because nuclear weapons had lost their raison d'être.

He welcomed the reduction of 20 to 30 per cent in the strategic arsenals, but noted with anxiety that the weapons themselves were not disappearing, but were being redeployed outside Europe, to other regions. Thus, the nuclear threat had dwindled in Europe, but it had not disappeared. Nuclear disarmament would not be achieved as long as nuclear weapon testing and the production of fissionable material for military purposes continued. The necessary steps must therefore be taken to "suffocate" the nuclear arms race.

Mexico attached great importance to the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided for in article IV and in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs of the NPT, and emphasized the need to expand that co-operation and strengthen the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear energy was an essential component in the energy programmes of 27 countries in which a total of 434 nuclear power plants were located; and nuclear energy already account for 17 per cent of the world's electricity.

Several warnings, some of them tragic as in the case of Chernobyl, had highlighted the risks inherent in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Meetings had been devoted to the study of those risks. Interest in nuclear energy had declined in recent years, essentially for reasons of safety and of cost. That was a no doubt temporary state of affairs, and renewed efforts must be made to meet increased demands for nuclear know-how and equipment for peaceful purposes. The development of nuclear energy for civilian uses could give rise to suspicions regarding certain military intentions and article III of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system were thus very important in that context. He noted, nevertheless, that some countries continued to lay disproportionate emphasis on that aspect, to the detriment of the Agency's co-operation programme.

Mexico remained ready to play an active role, but considered that the international community's tolerance was not inexhaustible and that it was impossible to continue to sustain a system in which certain countries enjoyed all the advantages and others had reached the limits of their patience. The situation was clear: the principles of the NPT must lead to a real and valid commitment. Otherwise, the future of humanity and of the Treaty itself were uncertain. Mexico urged all delegations to strive to achieve results in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of the countries of the world. Any element of preconception which jeopardized dialogue and risked frustrating the legitimate hopes which nations had placed in the Conference must be firmly set aside.

Mr. Benhima (Morocco) took the Chair.

Mr. LUONG (Viet Nam) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the corner-stone of the non-proliferation régime, despite all the problems linked with its implementation. He was pleased to note that since the Third Review Conference there had been new accessions to the Treaty. The large number of participants in the Conference, and the participation of non-party States, especially of two nuclear-weapon States, encouraged hopes that the objective of universality of the Treaty would be attained.

Since the Third Review Conference, international relations had undergone profound modifications. The world had moved out of the cold war period into one of dialogue and co-operation. There were now real possibilities of preserving international peace and security and finding equitable solutions to regional conflicts. In that context, the process of both general and nuclear disarmament had made great progress. With the entry into force of the INF Agreement in 1988, genuine nuclear disarmament measures had been taken for the first time in history. Also to be welcomed was the signature of the verification protocols to the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976, as well as the progress being made towards conclusion of the START treaty, which provided for important reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. There was reason to be satisfied, but not excessively so, since even if the START treaty were well implemented, thousands of nuclear warheads would remain, enough to cause a nuclear holocaust whose consequences would bring about the total destruction of civilization.

The Vietnamese delegation hoped that the nuclear disarmament process would continue, and that non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the nuclear option would succeed in their demand that the nuclear-weapon States fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

He was convinced that the most decisive step to end the nuclear arms race was a total ban on nuclear weapon tests. He noted with satisfaction the recent revival, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban, and hoped that it would meet in the very near future. He found it unacceptable that some nuclear-weapon States relied on nuclear deterrence as their official security doctrine and persisted in believing that nuclear weapon testing was essential to ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons. Equally unacceptable was the view held by certain States that the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests could only be a long-term objective. That position was at variance with the basic principles of the NPT.

The Vietnamese delegation considered that the time was ripe for an immediate moratorium on all nuclear explosions, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In that connection, it endorsed the appeal by the group of non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT and also welcomed the readiness of the Soviet Union to adopt such a moratorium on the basis of reciprocity with the United States.

The non-nuclear-weapon States had the right to demand that all the nuclear-weapon States renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Unfortunately, there had been no progress in negotiations on that question. So far, only one nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty had guaranteed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he supported the initiative by Nigeria on the strengthening of negative security assurances, and hoped that the changes taking place in international relations and in the concepts of security would make it possible to solve that question in the near future.

Concerning the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the NPT, he welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1986, and expressed the hope that many South Pacific and other countries would ratify all the protocols to that Treaty.

Viet Nam had on more than one occasion supported the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South East Asia region, and it endorsed the ASEAN countries' initiative in that regard. His country also supported the efforts being made to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world.

Viet Nam fully supported the IAEA safeguards system which, in accordance with article III of the NPT, was designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; it had, moreover, signed a full-scope safeguards agreement for its own nuclear reactor.

Concerning article IV of the NPT, Viet Nam paid tribute to the efforts of IAEA to enable all States Parties, and particularly the developing countries, to have access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Like the non-aligned countries, Viet Nam considered that there should be a better balance between IAEA's expenditure on assistance and on its safeguard functions.

The future of the NPT would depend on events up to the extension conference in 1995. For the present it was important for the Fourth Review Conference to work out measures that would ensure the global application of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

PROVISIONAL
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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 3.25 p.m.

President: Mr. F. PERPIÑA-ROBERT (Spain)

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General debate (continued)

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STELLA UNIVERSITY

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon) said that the remarkable improvement in the international climate and the enhanced role of the United Nations should make it possible to realize the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals, and promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with due account of the needs of the developing countries that were States Parties to the Treaty.

The NPT continued to serve as the corner-stone for the international non-proliferation régime, the Treaty having played a vital role over the past 20 years in reducing the risk of nuclear war, thereby making an invaluable contribution to international stability and world peace. The arms race, whether nuclear or conventional, was particularly destabilizing for developing countries, whose main concern was to improve the living conditions of their populations. To achieve that aim, peace must reign, and disputes must be settled by peaceful means. The arms race made such efforts more difficult, diverting for military uses valuable resources that could have been used for development.

Nuclear disarmament was an essential element in any serious steps to bring about national, regional or international security and development, for which reason, Cameroon had always been a staunch supporter of the Treaty, which, on the whole, had functioned well. The total number of States Parties had grown, and for the first time, two nuclear-weapon non-party States were attending the Conference as observers. It was to be hoped that the present Review Conference would take concrete measures to enhance the Treaty's work and that other States would accede to it in the future.

Despite the major progress made in reducing strategic nuclear arsenals, the Conference still had important work before it. It must take a stance on the discriminatory aspects and imbalances contained in the Treaty, particularly with regard to the commitments made by the depositaries on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. It must also increase its efforts to ensure that States Parties fully met their obligations under the Treaty. Again, concrete measures must be identified to help to achieve the goal of complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban, as well as to enhance international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

His delegation welcomed the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States Parties that they had scrupulously fulfilled their obligations under article I of the Treaty. No overt case of nuclear-weapon proliferation had been noted since the Third Conference. Yet the growth of the nuclear capability of a number of States that, for the most part, were not States Parties to the Treaty gave cause for concern, as did the alarming rate at which nuclear arsenals were being modernized. The Conference must give careful consideration to developments that might be inconsistent with the obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty.

The IAEA safeguards system provided for in article III had worked satisfactorily since the previous Review Conference. It should be noted that on 30 June 1990, safeguard agreements had been in force for 85 of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties (NPT/CONF.IV/12, para. 10) and that no diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material had been detected (NPT/CONF.IV/12, para. 6). His delegation hoped that the Conference would give due consideration to the problems encountered by the Agency in further increasing the efficiency of a system that had long proved its worth.

With regard to article IV, the energy requirements of developing countries had not diminished since the Third Review Conference. Non-nuclear-weapon States were therefore entitled to expect greater co-operation in the field of much-needed applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was to be hoped that the non-aligned countries' proposals in that regard would be favourably received, especially in view of the failure of the PUNE Conference of 1987 to achieve satisfactory results. Concern with non-proliferation should not serve as a pretext for preventing countries from acquiring or developing peaceful nuclear techniques or for imposing conditions incompatible with the sovereign rights and independence of States. It was essential that the Treaty's three objectives of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotion of co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially for the benefit of developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and general and complete disarmament should be pursued simultaneously and in good faith by all of the Parties. His delegation therefore hoped that the nuclear States Parties to the Treaty as well as other Parties capable of doing so would undertake to increase their technical and financial assistance, bilaterally or through the IAEA or other suitable international mechanisms, with a view to enabling developing States Parties to

derive more of the benefits envisaged under article V. In view of the potential risk to human life and the environment, and bearing in mind the principle of non-use of force in international relations embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, it was also essential that peaceful nuclear installations should be given suitable protection.

It was a matter of concern that, despite some significant developments such as the signing of the INF Treaty, the joint declaration on non-proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union and the adoption of verification protocols at the recent Washington Summit, as well as significant progress achieved at the Vienna and Stockholm talks, the undertakings set out in article VI had not been fully discharged during the period under review. The problem of the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, like that of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, remained unresolved. He continued to believe that the conclusion of an agreement on the complete halting of nuclear tests was an essential condition for compliance with article VI, and also supported the Nigerian proposal on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/17). It was also to be hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban re-established by the Conference on Disarmament would accelerate its work with a view to arriving at an early agreement which, together with measures prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties, would unquestionably contribute towards strengthening the NPT in particular and the non-proliferation régime in general, encouraging States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and restoring the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.

Lastly, stressing the major importance of the provisions of article VII, to many developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, he noted that in 1964, well before the NPT had been drafted, the African States had adopted a declaration on the denuclearization of their continent. Unfortunately, the entry into force of that declaration was still prevented by the attitude of South Africa, which had gradually acquired an alarming military nuclear capacity. His delegation welcomed the consensus reached on that issue within the Disarmament Commission, which would undoubtedly assist the General Assembly in adopting a set of measures guaranteeing respect for the Declaration.

Ms. SINEGIORGIS (Ethiopia), emphasizing the importance her delegation attached to the Conference, welcomed all observer States, in particular France and the People's Republic of China, and expressed satisfaction at the numerous accessions to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference of 1985. In the 20 years since its coming into force, the NPT had not only attracted a larger number of accessions than any other arms control treaty but had also achieved considerable success in averting horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five States which had possessed such weapons at the time the Treaty was signed, in 1968. The present Review Conference was the last opportunity to assess the implementation of the Treaty before a decision on extending it was taken in 1995.

The Conference was taking place at a particularly significant point in history, when the ending of the cold war gave rise to hopes that international peace and security might be achieved through disarmament rather than through confrontation and a hazardous recourse to armaments and the arms race. The dramatic changes in the international political climate which had occurred since the Third Review Conference had eased international tensions and brought about important developments in disarmament and confidence-building. In particular, the signature and implementation by the United States and the USSR of the INF Treaty could be considered a watershed marking the beginning of a new trend in disarmament. The two super-Powers were also to be commended for the steps they were taking towards the eagerly awaited conclusion of a START agreement. However, the significance of those two agreements should not be over-emphasized, since they were intended to eliminate only a very small proportion of the total number of nuclear weapons possessed by the super-Powers. Like many other participants in the Conference, Ethiopia considered that the trends in the arms race had not yet been reversed and that the current favourable international atmosphere should serve as a spur to further significant progress in the fulfilment of commitments entered into under the terms of the Treaty.

When the NPT had been opened for signature more than 20 years previously, Ethiopia had been one of the first signatory States, not only because the Treaty imposed a legal barrier against the further spread of nuclear weapons but also because it was expected to promote progress in nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, the ultimate goal of achieving nuclear disarmament still seemed very remote today and the threat of nuclear

catastrophe still loomed over the planet. Adherence to the Treaty was still far from universal; not all nuclear-weapon-States were Parties, and it was an open secret that a number of countries, having acquired the necessary materials and technological know-how, now had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear capability ambitions of certain States were a serious impediment to endeavours within the framework of the Treaty. If the present trend towards the non-application of safeguards in the transfer of materials which could be utilized for the production of nuclear weapons was allowed to continue, the NPT régime would be further weakened and eroded.

With the relaxation of international tensions and the ending of the cold war, the continuance of the arms race had become an anomaly. The nuclear-weapon States should grasp the opportunity offered them by the prevailing favourable political climate by discharging as fully as possible their obligations under the Treaty. A particularly timely and significant step would be the conclusion of an effective, verifiable and comprehensive test ban treaty, which would not only strengthen the NPT régime but would also provide some States with an incentive to accede to the Treaty. In that connection, it was gratifying to note that, after an interval of 7 years, the Conference on Disarmament had re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which had already made a good start on its work. Her delegation appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty as soon as possible.

Every effort should also be made to conclude an agreement of a legal and binding character on negative security assurances for States which had renounced the possession of nuclear weapons or the stationing of such weapons in their territory. Nigeria's proposal on that issue (NCB/CONF.IV/17) was timely and, in the present improved international atmosphere, deserved a positive response.

As to the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Ethiopia had always supported efforts aimed at establishing them; in 1964, it had been among the countries which had taken the initiative leading to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa by the Organization of African Unity, and had worked ever since towards the Declaration's implementation. It was indeed regrettable that continued calls by the General Assembly and other forums to declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone remained unheeded. The wishes and

decisions of non-nuclear-weapon States to keep their respective regions free from nuclear weapons should be encouraged, respected and reciprocated by positive action on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. RIVAS (Colombia) said that the Conference was meeting in particularly complex circumstances which had both a positive and a negative side to them as far as international peace and security were concerned. Ideological détente, rapprochement between the two super-Powers and the rapid changes in Eastern Europe were taking place at a time of recrudescence of regional tension, ethnic confrontation and a relative deterioration in the standard of living of more than three quarters of mankind. The background was one still dominated by an arms race that was unlimited as far as conventional weapons were concerned and, despite some successes in regard to nuclear weapons, an undeniable increase in the danger of horizontal proliferation, regardless of international commitments to the contrary. There was clear consensus on the virtues of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the positive results achieved in the 20 years it had been in force. The Treaty had sought to prevent unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons, pointing a finger at those who had fraudulently violated its provisions; it had succeeded in establishing what was, on the whole, a serious and useful system of verification.

None the less, while international opinion recognized the merits of the Treaty, it was also convinced that the NPT needed to be strengthened and complemented in some areas. Compliance was called for on the part of both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States. Articles I and II should not be circumvented in any way and should cover not only nuclear weapons and explosives as such but also those elements inextricably linked with the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The verification system established in article III of the Treaty should be made universal so that safeguards could be extended to all components essential for the use of nuclear energy, including those intended for peaceful uses, and should be extended to all States, which benefited from the transfer of technology or of nuclear materials. The limitations which hampered the work at the IAEA - lack of resources and lack of international commitment - must disappear to give rise to a less discriminatory system and provide greater security for the cause of peace and security.

The principle set out in article IV of the Treaty should be supplemented by a policy to make it possible in practice to achieve the objectives of developing research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Developing countries in particular faced great difficulty in enjoying the benefits of nuclear scientific and technological achievements. Such countries as had endorsed the Treaty and were fulfilling their obligations should not be prejudiced by the type of co-operation that some nuclear States provided to non-party States, in clear violation of their legal obligations. In that respect, his delegation endorsed the statement made to the Review Conference by the spokesmen for the Non-Aligned States and other States Parties not forming part of the Western and Eastern European groups.

The Conference afforded an exceptional opportunity for nuclear powers to strengthen their commitment under article VI. Important, albeit partial, steps had been taken on the road to nuclear disarmament, or rather to a lower rate of nuclear armament. There was no doubt, however, that international opinion and the aspirations of all peoples continued to be in favour of bolder and more ambitious measures in that field. It was not enough for the two super-Powers to agree on certain limitations to their nuclear arsenals while leaving their destructive capacity intact, if nuclear-weapon States continued the race towards technical improvement of their weapons of mass destruction and a vertical proliferation which continued to threaten mankind, something that was against the very spirit of the Treaty.

Article VI fundamentally concerned the nuclear-weapon and potential nuclear-weapon States. It was difficult to imagine any serious attempt at nuclear disarmament that did not involve a ban on nuclear weapons testing. For that reason, there was increasing support for a total ban treaty to complement the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. His delegation, while not having called for the Amendment Conference for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, none the less recognized the importance of such a Conference.

One aspect of overwhelming importance was that of assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Throughout the period of negotiation of the Treaty, the concern of those States at being exposed to a situation in which nuclear-weapon States were not subject to any binding commitment not to use such weapons had been evident and had been reflected in the attitude of nuclear-weapon States parties, which had sponsored the agreement resulting in 1968 in the adoption of Security Council resolution 255. However, that

"positive" assurance had never been considered sufficient by the non-nuclear-weapon States, even when strengthened by later declarations by States Parties and other States. The reasons for such dissatisfaction were clearly outlined in the document presented by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17). The Colombian delegation therefore considered that the time had come to embark on negotiations to provide sufficient guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. Such negative assurances deserved to be given careful consideration so that they might be refined and enriched by the international community for the purposes of complementing the non-proliferation system and making it truly universal.

To achieve universality and to secure the spirit in which the Treaty had been negotiated, efforts must be undertaken to ensure that nuclear-weapon States, and non-nuclear-weapon States that were not yet parties acceded to the Treaty as soon as possible. The difficulties encountered by many States in relation to the Treaty should be resolved in the interests of the cause of world peace. While it would be difficult under present circumstances to amend the text of the Treaty itself, it was possible and desirable to improve and complement its provisions by means of additional agreements, preferably on a multilateral basis, covering aspects essential to the non-proliferation system and nuclear disarmament.

Such interest in strengthening, making up the shortcomings and extending the scope of the Treaty did not, however, mean that it must be considered as the only possible system to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons and arrive at nuclear disarmament. Regional instruments, the most significant being the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, provided a valuable means of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had preceded the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did not cover the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba not having acceded to it. It was unnecessarily weakened and the force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself was prejudiced as a result. His country was pleased to note the efforts being made by some countries in Latin America to amend provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that were preventing other countries from becoming parties to it. The Treaty also had the merit of compelling nuclear Powers to respect the denuclearization commitment of the States Parties and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States, thereby establishing the negative assurance that was lacking in the

Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that respect, the efforts of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) to achieve the universality of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and monitor compliance with the relevant obligations were welcome; document NPT/CONF.IV/15 from that body was an important contribution to the present Review Conference.

In view of the obligation for States Parties to decide in 1995 whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely or for a given period, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, it was necessary to define clearly the characteristics of the future Conference and the opportunities it offered. It was important to determine whether only the matter of extending the Treaty was to be discussed or whether the question of a review might also be included. In that respect, the work of the Preparatory Committee would be followed with interest. His delegation hoped that the wealth of material obtained from the four Review Conferences held so far would be duly utilized at the 1995 meeting.

Colombia, as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, considered that the present Conference should, on the basis of the statements made by participating countries and particularly the statements made on behalf of nuclear-weapon States, reaffirm the validity and usefulness of the Treaty. At the same time, it was necessary to go further and ease the way for those States which had not completely fulfilled their obligations to do so in the future. It must not be forgotten that nuclear disarmament, as an essential complement to non-proliferation, was only one stage in mankind's long-term objective, which was general and complete disarmament. Such a goal was fundamental to the Treaty, and indeed was specified in article VI. His country continued to hope that the text of that article would not remain a dead letter but would become a reality and would guarantee mankind the future to which it was entitled.

Mr. RIVADENEIRA (Ecuador) said that the international community must undertake major efforts to banish the true causes of confrontations between nations by seeking equitable solutions to enormous past injustices and reducing the glaring disparities between rich and poor countries. Only then could the world live in peace and harmony. If backwardness, hunger and disease and the crushing external debt of the developing countries were eliminated, the spectre of nuclear war would fade, particularly now, when the East-West struggle had considerably declined.

His delegation supported the point of view of the Non-Aligned Countries, particularly with regard to the halting of nuclear tests; Ecuador, with its coastline on the Pacific Ocean, was deeply concerned that testing continued despite repeated international protest. His Government also deemed it extremely important to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the developing countries.

His delegation underscored the importance of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Ecuador actively supported those two instruments and was prepared to work towards greater implementation and an extension of the TNP. It was to be hoped that the steps needed to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would be taken without delay and he fully endorsed the memorandum submitted by General Secretariat of OPANAL (NPT/CONF.IV/15).

Since the Third Review Conference, a new denuclearized zone had been created in 1986 under the Treaty of Rarotonga, a landmark on the road to the denuclearization of the planet. Hopefully, other nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established, preferably in regions that had been focal points of international conflict and tension. It was also important for the various international forums on disarmament, for example the Conference on Disarmament, the Fourth Review Conference itself and those meetings that examined the problems of other types of weapons of mass destruction or the use of the marine environment and outer space, to co-ordinate their work and exchange information so as to arrive at allied general solutions. Equally crucial was the need to control the production and sale of conventional weapons, which, in the long run, could prove to be just as cruel and devastating. One major shortcoming of the NPT was its absence of universality, and the Conference should therefore reiterate its appeal to all nuclear-weapon States and to non-nuclear-weapon States, especially threshold States, to accede to the Treaty. Without their participation, the NPT would never achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament.

Ecuador was deeply concerned that it was possible to avoid complying with the obligation under article I of the Treaty not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to non-party States, that had begun development of nuclear programmes without being subject to the Treaty's restrictions. It was incomprehensible that military assistance could be provided to countries known to be experimenting with vectors for nuclear warheads.

According to the data provided by the IAEA, few nuclear facilities in the States Parties to the Treaty were not subject to the safeguards régime. His Government wondered, however, how useful those safeguards could be if both nuclear-weapon States and threshold States refused to accept them. The Agency should be commended for its efforts in implementing safeguards and working towards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but much remained to be done. The technical assistance resources offered by the IAEA to help developing countries acquire nuclear energy sources - in support of their economic and social development - continued to be scarce. Thus, there was an inexplicable imbalance in the importance that the Agency's main contributors attached to article III and to article IV of the Treaty. The granting of resources for IAEA's verification work should in no case be to the detriment of technical assistance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

While he welcomed the efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States to comply with article VI of the Treaty, it was important to make further progress in negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race. The exceptionally favourable international situation must be used to convert the Partial Test Ban Treaty into an instrument banning all nuclear testing, the long-term goal being complete disarmament.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.